IPA Analyzer
Drop an iOS package — an .ipa file — and read what it declares about itself before it gets anywhere near a phone: its name and bundle ID, the version and build, the oldest iOS it will install on, the exact words it will show when it asks for your camera or location, the capabilities its provisioning profile allows, the frameworks bundled inside it, and the certificates it is signed with. The file never leaves your device: it is opened and parsed in this page, not uploaded, because an installer you are suspicious of is exactly the file you should not be handing to a stranger’s server.
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Or drop the file anywhere in this box. Everything below is read from the package itself, on this device — the Info.plist, the provisioning profile and the code signature hashes.
App summary
Privacy permissions
These are the exact strings from Info.plist — the literal words iOS shows in the permission prompt. A permission with no usage description here cannot be requested at all on modern iOS; Apple rejects the build.
Entitlements
Linked frameworks
Provisioning profile
Signing certificates
Code signature (CodeResources)
Files in the package
Notes
What an .ipa declares before it runs a line of code
An .ipa is a ZIP archive with opinions. Rename one to .zip and any unzip tool will open it: a Payload folder holding a single .app bundle, and inside that bundle the app’s executable, its resources, its frameworks and its signature. The first file iOS reads is Info.plist, and it is a surprisingly complete statement of intent. It names the app and its bundle ID — the identity updates are matched against — and the two versions every release carries: the marketing version people see and the build number developers track. It states the oldest iOS the app claims to install on and whether it is built for iPhone, iPad or both. It lists the URL schemes the app answers to and the background modes it may run in. And it carries the privacy permission texts — the NS*UsageDescription strings — which are not decoration: they are the literal sentences iOS shows when the app asks for your camera, photos, microphone or location, and a permission with no description string cannot be requested at all.
The other half of the story is the provisioning profile. Every iOS app ships with embedded.mobileprovision, a property list wrapped in a signature that answers five questions: who may sign the code, which App ID it covers, which devices may run it, when it expires, and which entitlements it allows — push notifications, keychain groups, App Groups, associated domains. An app that claims an entitlement its profile does not allow will not launch. Beside it sits _CodeSignature/CodeResources, the signature’s hash inventory: a SHA-1 and SHA-256 digest for every file in the bundle, so iOS can tell whether anything changed since signing. This page reads the profile’s certificates — the signing identities the profile authorises — and shows each one’s subject, issuer, validity window and SHA-256 fingerprint, which the certificate and key matcher can compare against a key you hold. The companion guide, what is inside an IPA before you install it, walks the whole inspection as a checklist. Two honest limits: this page reads declarations, not behaviour — it does not verify the signature cryptographically, does not decompile code, and does not judge whether an app is malware — and where the package itself is silent (a missing profile, a file CodeResources does not list), it says so rather than filling the gap with a guess. To open any plist by hand, the Plist Workbench reads and edits both formats; for the Android sibling of this check, the APK Analyzer does the same job for Android packages.
What lives inside an .ipa
| IPA | An iOS application package: a ZIP archive holding one Payload/<App>.app bundle. Rename it to .zip and any unzip tool can open it — but the property lists inside are usually binary, which is why they need a reader. |
| Payload | The folder at the top of every .ipa. It holds exactly one .app bundle — the app itself, with its executable, Info.plist, resources, frameworks and signature. |
| Info.plist | The app’s identity card: bundle ID, versions, minimum iOS, device family, and the NS*UsageDescription strings iOS shows when the app asks for a permission. |
| embedded.mobileprovision | The provisioning profile, a property list wrapped in a CMS signature: who may sign the code, which App ID it covers, which devices may run it, when it expires, and which entitlements it allows. |
| Entitlements | The capabilities an app claims — push notifications, keychain groups, App Groups, associated domains. Every entitlement the app claims must be allowed by its provisioning profile. |
| CodeResources | The signature’s hash inventory, in _CodeSignature/CodeResources: a SHA-1 (hash) and SHA-256 (hash2) digest for every file in the bundle, so iOS can tell whether anything changed since signing. |
Frequently asked questions
Where does my IPA file go?
Nowhere. The file is opened and parsed in this page, on your device, and nothing is uploaded, transmitted or stored — analysing a file makes no network request. That matters here more than for most tools: the IPAs people most want inspected are the ones they already distrust — a file from a forum, a direct download, a beta build that looks wrong — and sending a suspicious installer to a remote scanning service is its own exposure. It also works offline once the page has loaded.
What should I check before installing an IPA?
Five things, all visible above. The bundle ID: is it the publisher’s real namespace, or a lookalike with one character changed? The version and minimum iOS: will it even install on your device, and is it the build you were told to expect? The privacy permissions: read the exact prompt text — does a torch app really need your precise location and microphone? The entitlements and profile: does it claim push, keychain groups or App Groups it has no business with, and is the profile still in date? And the signer: compare the SHA-256 fingerprint against the copy you trust before sideloading a “newer version” from anywhere.
Can this tell me whether an app is malware?
No, and any tool that promises that from a package listing alone is overselling. This page reads what the package declares — identity, permissions, entitlements, frameworks and signatures — which is enough to catch the careless and the impersonators: a clone with the wrong bundle ID, a flashlight demanding microphone access, a profile that expired months ago. Judging what the code actually does needs decompilation, dynamic analysis or a reputable scanner’s verdict on the binary itself. Treat a clean result here as “nothing declared looks wrong”, never as a safety certificate.