File Encryptor — AES-256-GCM

Encrypt any file with a password, in your browser, one 1 MiB chunk at a time — and decrypt it back with the original filename restored. The file and the password never leave your device.

A file is the one thing you must never paste into a chat. A chatbot can describe AES-GCM, but it cannot encrypt your real file — and your file is precisely what must never be uploaded to a random “encrypt online” site. This tool encrypts the file on your own machine with AES-256-GCM and a password you choose, streaming it in 1 MiB chunks, and writes an open, documented .sysxenc container you can decrypt here or with the Python decryptor in the companion article encrypting files with AES-256-GCM in your browser. For messages and identity, use the PGP suite; for files with just a password, use this. Clean a document’s metadata first with the document cleaner, and check a digest with the hash generator.

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Any file. It is read in 1 MiB chunks in your browser and never uploaded.

Or drop a file here.

Minimum 8 characters. This password is the only key — there is no recovery.

Demo only: encrypts a small generated text file in your browser and decrypts it again — no download needed. The demo password is shown on screen; it is a demo password, do not use it for real files.

🔒 Your file and password are encrypted in your browser and never leave your device. No account, no upload, no server call.

The SYSXENC v1 format (open, documented)

Header: the 8 magic bytes SYSXENC1, then a 2-byte big-endian header length, then the header JSON: {v:1, kdf:"PBKDF2-SHA256", iter:600000, salt (base64, 16 bytes), chunkSize:1048576, name (original filename), size (plaintext bytes), sha256 (hex of the plaintext), created (ISO timestamp)}. The header is not encrypted: the filename and the plaintext size are visible to anyone holding the file.

Body: one record per chunk — a 4-byte big-endian ciphertext length, a 12-byte random IV, then the ciphertext, which is the plaintext chunk plus a 16-byte GCM authentication tag. The last chunk may be shorter. An empty file is header only, with zero chunks and the SHA-256 of the empty string.

Authentication: each chunk is bound to this file and its position by its AAD — the exact header JSON bytes followed by the chunk index as a 32-bit little-endian integer. A chunk spliced in from another file, or reordered, fails authentication. Decrypt verifies every chunk’s tag (and reports the failing chunk index) and then verifies the plaintext SHA-256 against the header.

Key derivation: PBKDF2-SHA-256, 600,000 iterations (OWASP 2023), 256-bit key, a fresh 16-byte random salt per file. Chunk size is fixed at 1 MiB by the format — it is not a setting. A wrong password fails the first chunk’s authentication tag, so a wrong password never produces a silently corrupt file.

What AES-256-GCM guarantees — and what it does not

AES-256-GCM gives you confidentiality plus per-chunk authentication: 256-bit AES encrypts each 1 MiB chunk, and the 16-byte GCM tag proves that chunk was not changed after encryption. Change one byte of ciphertext and decryption refuses that chunk instead of handing you altered data. PBKDF2 with 600,000 iterations makes each password guess expensive for an attacker who steals the file.

It does not hide the filename or the file size — both sit in the plaintext header. It does not protect a weak password against guessing: a short or common password can be tried offline, fast, against the stolen file, so the password is the whole security of the scheme. It does not protect a compromised device: if your machine is already owned, the password and the plaintext are visible while you type and decrypt.

Streaming is why there is no size cap here. Other AES tools cap files at 10 MB because they hold the whole file in memory; this one reads the file in 1 MiB slices, encrypts one slice at a time, and — in Chromium or Edge — writes each ciphertext chunk straight to disk through the File System Access API, so peak memory stays near 1 MiB. Firefox and Safari have no streaming file writer, so the tool accumulates a download there instead: honest, and stated on the page.

Be honest with yourself before you encrypt

There is no password recovery, ever. The password is turned into the key by PBKDF2 and then discarded; nobody — not this site, not the tool, not anyone you ask — can open a .sysxenc file without it. A lost password means the file is unrecoverable. Write the password down somewhere safe before you encrypt anything you care about.

True streaming needs Chromium or Edge. In Firefox or Safari the encrypted output is accumulated and downloaded as one file, which needs enough memory and disk for the whole ciphertext — for very large files on those browsers, use a Chromium browser instead. The encrypt side is always chunked, so reading never holds the whole file in memory.

A password you reuse from a breached site is a weak password, however long it looks. The strength meter on this page is an estimate from length and character classes, not a guarantee — it cannot know whether the password is already public. Use a password you use nowhere else.

What happens to your file

Nothing leaves your browser. The file is read slice by slice and encrypted by WebCrypto on this page: no upload, no server call, no storage, no account. The password is used only to derive the key and is never sent anywhere. Closing the page discards everything.

Frequently asked questions

I lost my password. Can I get my file back?

No. There is no recovery, by design: the password is the only key, it is never sent to a server, and nobody holds a copy. PBKDF2 with 600,000 iterations also makes guessing a strong password infeasible. If the file matters, keep the password somewhere safe — a password manager, or paper in a drawer — before you encrypt.

Can I decrypt a .sysxenc file without this site?

Yes — the format is fully documented above, and the companion article includes a short Python decryptor (standard library hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac plus the cryptography package for AES-GCM) that was verified against a file this tool produced. Any tool that implements the same header, chunk layout and AAD rule can read the file. What you cannot do is decrypt it with the OpenSSL command line directly: OpenSSL has no mode for this chunked, per-chunk-AAD container.

Why is there no file-size limit here, when other AES tools cap files at 10 MB?

Because those tools hold the whole file in memory at once, and a browser tab cannot safely hold a gigabyte. This tool reads the file in 1 MiB slices and — in Chromium or Edge — streams each encrypted chunk straight to disk, so memory stays near 1 MiB no matter how large the file is. In Firefox and Safari the output is accumulated into one download instead, so very large files there are better done in a Chromium browser.